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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 




Appellant, Curtis Johnson, appeals from an order entered 
on August 29, 1996, in this habeas corpus action following 
his conviction for aggravated assault in the Common Pleas 
Court of Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania. The district 
court denied Johnson's petition in a comprehensive 
memorandum opinion accompanying the order. Johnson v. 
Rosemeyer, Civ. No. 95-7365 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 27, 1996). 
Johnson raises two issues on this appeal. First, he 
contends that "the district court erred in failing to grant 
habeas relief where the state trial court's jury instruction[s] 
on justification [were] erroneous and thus violated [his] 
right to due process." Br. at 11. Second, he urges that he 
"was denied due process because of the trial court's 
incomplete and erroneous jury instruction[s] on aggravated 
assault." Br. at 34. After a careful review of the matter, we 
have concluded that we should affirm the district court's 
order. We confine our discussion to the court's instructions 
to the jury on the justification issue, as Johnson's 
contention with respect to the aggravated assault 
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instructions clearly affords no basis for habeas corpus 
relief. 
 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
There is no dispute regarding the basic facts in this case. 
On November 27, 1988, Johnson, a Philadelphia police 
officer, shot and seriously wounded James Cahill while off 
duty. This unfortunate incident arose from a dispute 
between Johnson and Cahill's mother, who was a tenant in 
an apartment building Johnson owned. At his trial on the 
aggravated assault charge in the state court, Johnson 
testified that Cahill assaulted him with a shovel, and that 
he then shot Cahill after Cahill attempted to escape when 
Johnson tried to arrest him. 
 
As Johnson explains in his brief, his "sole defense" at 
trial was that he "was justified in shooting Cahill in order 
to prevent his escape." Br. at 11. Pennsylvania law sets 
forth the circumstances in which a law enforcement officer 
may use force in making an arrest in 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
Ann. § 508 (West 1983) ("section 508"): 
 
 Use of force in law enforcement (a) Peace officer's use 
of force in making arrest. -- 
 
 (1) A peace officer, or any person whom he has 
summoned or directed to assist him, need not retreat 
or desist from efforts to make a lawful arrest because 
of resistance or threatened resistance to the arrest. He 
is justified in the use of any force which he believes to 
be necessary to effect the arrest and of any force which 
he believes to be necessary to defend himself or 
another from bodily harm while making the arrest. 
However, he is justified in using deadly force only when 
he believes that such force is necessary to prevent 
death or serious bodily injury to himself or such other 
person, or when he believes both that: 
 
 (i) such force is necessary to prevent the arrest from 
being defeated by resistance or escape; and 
 
 (ii) the person to be arrested has committed or 
attempted a forcible felony or is attempting to escape 
and possesses a deadly weapon, or otherwise indicates 
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that he will endanger human life or inflict serious 
bodily injury unless arrested without delay. 
 
In recognition of Johnson's contention that section 508 
justified his use of force, the trial court instructed the jury 
that a police officer: 
 
is justified using deadly force only when he believes 
that such force is necessary to prevent the death or 
serious bodily injury to himself or another or when he 
believes that both are present, these two factors are 
present and such force is necessary to prevent the 
arrest from being defeated by resistance or escape, and 
the person to be arrested has committed or attempted 
to commit a forcible felony under the act. 
 
App. at 323. The court defined aggravated assault as an 
attempt to cause serious bodily injury to another or 
intentionally causing serious bodily injury to another in 
accordance with 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2702 (West 
Supp. 1997). App. at 321. 
 
During its deliberations, the jury sent a question to the 
court asking whether an arresting police officer was 
"obliged to use deadly force to shoot against a fleeing felony 
[sic] under all circumstances or can an alternative measure 
be taken to secure the arrest." App. at 348-49 (emphasis in 
original). The court responded as follows: 
 
 All right, we said that an officer is justified in using 
any force which he believes to be necessary to 
effectuate an arrest, any force generally, that's the 
general rule but he must use only that amount of force 
that is necessary to accomplish the arrest. Now, when 
it comes to the use of deadly force, deadly force being 
force that is likely to cause serious bodily injury or 
death, he is justified in using deadly force only when 
he believes that such force is necessary to prevent 
death or serious bodily injury to himself or such other 
person or when he believes both, one, that such force 
is necessary to prevent the arrest from being defeated. 
An arrest being defeated meaning that, being not 
effectuated, that he could not make the arrest 
otherwise, and the person to be arrested has 
committed or attempted a forcible felony, and is fleeing 
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therefrom. That's the only thing I can tell you. It is the 
standard. You utilize it. I could answer your question 
yes or no but I can't without interfering with your 
obligation to make a determination of the facts. Again 
the general rule is that a police officer can use force to 
effectuate an arrest and that amount that is necessary 
to make that arrest. He can use only that force that is 
necessary, however when he has to use deadly force, 
then he must meet special conditions: that he must 
believe that he cannot effectuate the arrest, that is the 
arrest becomes defeated unless he can use deadly force 
of [sic] a fleeing felon, all right? 
 
App. at 349-50. The jury subsequently convicted Johnson. 
 
After the trial court denied Johnson's post-trial motions 
and sentenced him, Johnson appealed to the Superior 
Court, a Pennsylvania intermediate appellate court. 
Johnson contended on appeal, as he has in these habeas 
corpus proceedings, that section 508 establishes three 
separate and distinct circumstances in which a police 
officer may use force to effectuate an arrest: (1) when the 
police officer believes that such force is necessary to 
prevent death or serious bodily injury to himself or another 
person; (2) when necessary to prevent the arrest from being 
defeated by resistance or escape and the person to be 
arrested has committed or attempted a forcible felony; or (3) 
when necessary to prevent the arrest from being defeated 
by resistance or escape and the person attempting to 
escape possesses a deadly weapon or otherwise indicates 
that he will endanger human life or inflict serious bodily 
injury unless arrested without delay. Johnson further 
contended in the Superior Court that the trial court's 
instructions to the jury, even as the court amplified the 
instructions in response to the jury's question, did not 
conform with the above law. 
 
In an unpublished opinion the Superior Court rejected 
Johnson's contention, as well as other issues he raised, 
and thus affirmed his conviction. Commonwealth v. 
Johnson, 588 A.2d 561 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (table). That 
court held that the instructions, though ambiguous, did not 
require that it grant Johnson a new trial because Johnson 
was not entitled to a jury charge on justification, and 
 
                                5 
because the trial court in any event cleared up any 
confusion with its supplemental instructions. 
Commonwealth v. Johnson, slip op. at 5. In explaining why 
Johnson was not entitled to a justification charge, the court 
held that section 508 allows a police officer to use deadly 
force in effectuating an arrest only if the person to be 
arrested has committed a forcible felony and possesses a 
dangerous weapon, or otherwise indicates that he will 
endanger human life or inflict serious bodily injury unless 
arrested immediately. Id. 
 
The Superior Court made particular reference to 
Johnson's argument indicating: 
 
 Johnson would have us read § 508 disjunctively, 
thereby negating the element of endangerment where a 
`forcible felon' is pursued. This we cannot do. The 
phrase `committed or attempted a forcible felony or is 
attempting to escape' has, as a necessary condition, 
the requirement of `[possession of] a deadly weapon, or 
[other indication] that he will endanger human life or 
inflict serious bodily injury unless arrested without 
delay.' The statute is not to be read to allow deadly 
force to be used against a person who poses no threat 
to human life or safety. . . . 
 
Id. Johnson unsuccessfully sought allocatur from the 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and thereafter he 
unsuccessfully sought post-conviction relief in the state 
courts. 
 
Johnson, who had exhausted his state remedies, 
subsequently instituted these proceedings in the district 
court under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The district court referred 
the matter to a magistrate judge who filed a report and 
recommendation that the district court grant the petition 
on the ground that the trial court's instructions to the jury 
on justification were erroneous and deprived Johnson of 
due process of law. The magistrate judge, however, 
recommended that, to the extent that Johnson based the 
petition on a claim that erroneous jury instructions on 
aggravated assault denied him due process of law, the 
district court should deny the petition. The magistrate 
judge also recommended that the district court deny the 
 
                                6 
petition insofar as Johnson sought relief on grounds which 
he does not raise on this appeal and which we therefore 
need not detail. Both Johnson and the respondents filed 
objections to the report and recommendation. 
 
The district court decided the case in the comprehensive 
memorandum opinion to which we referred at the outset of 
this opinion. The district court set forth the background of 
the matter and then indicated, citing Kontakis v. Beyer, 19 
F.3d 110, 114 (3d Cir. 1994), that it could grant a petition 
for a writ of habeas corpus only when there has been a 
violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 
States. Johnson, slip op. at 4. The court stated that it 
would make a de novo review of the magistrate judge's 
findings and recommendation insofar as the parties 
objected to them. Id. 
 
The court then set forth Johnson's contentions with 
respect to the meaning of section 508 and further noted the 
magistrate judge's conclusion that Johnson's contentions 
with respect to its meaning were correct. The court said 
that it is "axiomatic that federal habeas courts do not sit to 
re-examine state court determinations of state law," citing 
Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68, 112 S.Ct. 475, 480 
(1991). Johnson, slip op. at 8. While the court recognized, 
quoting Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691 n.11, 95 
S.Ct. 1881, 1886 n.11 (1975), that a federal court "may re- 
examine a state court's interpretation of its law if that 
interpretation appears to be an `obvious subterfuge to evade 
consideration of a federal issue,' " it pointed out that 
Johnson did not allege that there had been such an 
evasion. Johnson, slip op. at 8. 
 
The district court stated that the case was unusual 
"because the opinion in question was issued by 
Pennsylvania's intermediate appellate court and speaks to 
a matter that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not 
addressed directly." Johnson, slip op. at 8-9. The district 
court then pointed out that the magistrate judge cited West 
v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223, 61 S.Ct. 179 
(1940), and certain courts of appeals opinions for the 
proposition that a "federal habeas court may, in rare cases, 
disregard the decision of a state's intermediate appellate 
court where the federal court is convinced that the highest 
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court of the state would rule to the contrary." Johnson, slip 
op. at 9. See Watson v. Dugger, 945 F.2d 367, 369 (11th 
Cir. 1991); Olsen v. McFaul, 843 F.2d 918, 928-29 (6th Cir. 
1988); Sanderson v. Rice, 777 F.2d 902, 905 (4th Cir. 
1985). 
 
The district court said that in Barry v. Brower, 864 F.2d 
294 (3d Cir. 1988), we faced a situation not unlike that 
here. The court explained, quoting Barry, 864 F.2d at 298, 
that we held there that "a federal habeas court is bound by 
a state court's determination of state substantive law and 
`may not substitute its interpretation of state law for that of 
the state court whose action it is reviewing.' " Johnson, slip 
op. at 9-10. The district court then quoted Barry, 864 F.2d 
at 298 n.5, with respect to the distinction we drew there 
between a federal court's power to determine state law in a 
habeas corpus case and its power to determine state law in 
a diversity case, the court being freer to determine state law 
in the latter situation. 
 
The court then acknowledged that there is support for 
Johnson's interpretation of section 508 in Dolan v. Golla, 
481 F. Supp. 475, 480 (M.D. Pa. 1979), aff'd , 633 F.2d 209 
(3d Cir. 1980) (table), and Phillips v. Ward, 415 F. Supp. 
976, 979 (E.D. Pa. 1975), as well as in the legislative 
history of section 508 which is based on section 3.07 of the 
Model Penal Code. See Model Penal Code § 3.07 comment 
3(c). Johnson, slip op. at 10. Nevertheless, the district court 
indicated that it did not sit as a "super court of appeals" to 
pass judgment on matters of state law and that "[g]iven an 
authoritative decision of Pennsylvania's intermediate 
appellate court [it] decline[d] to speculate about the 
direction Pennsylvania law will take in the future." Johnson, 
slip op. at 11. 
 
Overall, the district court regarded itself as bound by the 
Superior Court opinion on Johnson's direct appeal and 
thus it rejected his argument to the extent he predicated it 
on his contention that the trial court's jury instructions on 
justification were erroneous. The district court also rejected 
Johnson's argument predicated on his contention that the 
trial court's jury instructions on aggravated assault were 
incomplete and erroneous as well as the other arguments 
he advanced. We, however, will not describe its opinion in 
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detail on these points because we summarily reject 
Johnson's argument based on the aggravated assault 





a. The standard of review 
 
On this appeal, Johnson reiterates the position he took in 
the district court that the trial court's jury instructions with 
respect to justification were erroneous and that the 
Superior Court opinion is not conclusive in the federal 
courts on the meaning of section 508. In view of the 
procedural posture of the case in which the district court 
based its decision on the record of the state court 
proceedings, rather than on facts found after an evidentiary 
hearing, we make a plenary review of the district court's 
order. See Kontakis v. Beyer, 19 F.3d at 113. We note that 
the parties have briefed this appeal without reference to the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. 
L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996), even though the 
district court decided the case after April 24, 1996, the 
effective date of that Act, and we further note that the 
district court did not mention that Act. In these 
circumstances, we, too, will decide the case without 
considering that Act, as we conclude that under prior law 
we should affirm the order of the district court and we can 
conceive of no basis for a conclusion that the Act enhanced 
Johnson's position. 
 
b. The instructions on justification raise only a state law 
issue. 
 
At the outset of our discussion, we point out that there 
is an answer, based on a point on which the parties have 
not centered their briefs, to Johnson's contention that he is 
entitled to relief because of the allegedly erroneous jury 
instructions pertaining to his justification defense. In 
Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. at 67-68, 112 S.Ct. at 480, the 
Supreme Court, after indicating that it is not the province 
of a federal habeas corpus court to re-examine state court 
determinations on state law questions, set forth that "a 
federal court is limited to deciding whether a conviction 
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violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 
States." Thus, we have stated that "it is well established 
that a state court's misapplication of its own law does not 
generally raise a constitutional claim. The federal courts 
have no supervisory authority over state judicial 
proceedings and may intervene only to correct wrongs of 
constitutional dimension." Geschwendt v. Ryan, 967 F.2d 
877, 888-89 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 
Accordingly, it is not surprising that Johnson recognizes 
that he cannot obtain relief simply by demonstrating that 
the state trial court and the Superior Court made a mistake 
of state law with respect to the jury instructions on the 
justification issue. Therefore, he attempts to predicate his 
argument on the Constitution by contending that the 
allegedly erroneous instructions to the jury on the 
justification issue denied him due process of law because it 
deprived him of an opportunity to present his defense. He 
explains that "the trial court's instructions 
unconstitutionally altered the Commonwealth's burden to 
disprove all elements of [his] justification defense beyond a 
reasonable doubt. By adding elements to the defense, the 
trial court made it easier for the Commonwealth to disprove 
Johnson's sole defense at trial." Br. at 32. 
 
In considering Johnson's contention, we realize that 
under Pennsylvania law a conviction for aggravated assault 
requires a showing that the defendant acted with malice, 
Commonwealth v. Hickson, 586 A.2d 393, 396 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1990), and that if the defendant acts with justification 
he will not have acted with malice. Commonwealth v. Rife, 
312 A.2d 406, 410 (Pa. 1973). We further recognize that if 
there was a mistake of state law in this case, the mistake, 
as Johnson urges, arguably relieved the state of the burden 
of proving an element of the offense, i.e., malice. We also 
recognize that even though the parties refer to justification 
as a defense it is something more, as by demonstrating the 
absence of malice the justification may negate an element 
of the offense. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 122, 107 
S.Ct. 1558, 1569 (1982). 
 
Yet the difficulty with Johnson's argument is that, even 
if the state courts made a mistake of state law which 
prejudiced Johnson by altering the proofs necessary to 
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support a conviction, to obtain habeas corpus relief he 
must demonstrate that the mistake deprived him of a right 
which he enjoyed under the Constitution, laws, or treaties 
of the United States. Thus, errors of state law cannot be 
repackaged as federal errors simply by citing the Due 
Process Clause. 
 
In considering whether this case involves a claim of error 
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 
States, it is critical to remember that the Supreme Court 
has made it clear that the states define the elements of 
state offenses. Accordingly, while there may be 
constitutionally required minimum criteria which must be 
met for conduct to constitute a state criminal offense, in 
general there is no constitutional reason why a state 
offense must include particular elements. See McMillan v. 
Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 84-86, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 2515-16 
(1986). 
 
It thus follows that for the error of state law in the 
justification instructions, assuming that there was an error, 
to be meaningful in this federal habeas corpus action, there 
would have to be a body of federal law justifying the use of 
deadly force which is applicable in a state criminal action 
charging an offense based on the defendant's use of that 
force. Then the error in the jury instructions would be 
significant if the instructions did not satisfy that body of 
law. Put in a different way, the jury instructions on 
justification, even if correct under state law, would need to 
have relieved the state of the necessity of proving an 
element of the offense as required by federal law or to have 
deprived the petitioner of a defense the state had to afford 
him under federal law in order to be significant in a federal 
habeas corpus action. If we concluded that a petitioner 
could obtain habeas corpus relief without making such a 
showing, then district courts in habeas corpus cases would 
sit as super state supreme courts for the purpose of 
determining whether jury instructions were correct under 
state law with respect to the elements of an offense and 
defenses to it. 
 
Our opinion in Humanik v. Beyer, 871 F.2d 432 (3d Cir. 
1989), a habeas corpus case involving a prisoner in state 
custody following a New Jersey state conviction, 
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demonstrates this point well. In Humanik we were 
concerned with New Jersey's diminished capacity statute, 
which provides that evidence that the defendant suffered 
from a mental disease or defect is admissible whenever it is 
relevant to the issue of whether the defendant had a state 
of mind which is an element of the offense. The New Jersey 
diminished capacity statute at the time of Humanik's trial 
provided that "[m]ental disease or defect is an affirmative 
defense which must be proved by a preponderance of the 
evidence." N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:4-2 (West 1995) (note) 
(section "2C:4-2"); see Humanik, 871 F.2d at 434. After 
Humanik's trial, the Supreme Court of New Jersey in other 
cases construed section 2C:4-2 to require a defendant 
relying on a diminished capacity argument to prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that he suffers from a 
mental disease or defect. The Supreme Court of New Jersey 
held that if the defendant did so, the state was required to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the disease or defect 
did not negate the state of mind which is an element of the 
crime, i.e., that the defendant acted purposely or knowingly 
despite his mental disease. Humanik, 871 F.2d at 439. 
 
In Humanik, we held that the instructions to the jury 
were erroneous under New Jersey law because they did not 
anticipate accurately the New Jersey Supreme Court's later 
explanation of the contrasting burdens of proof on the 
diminished capacity issue. Id. at 442. We then held that 
even if we had concluded that the jury instructions 
complied with New Jersey law, we nevertheless would grant 
the writ because the instructions placed a burden of proof 
of an element of the offense, that the defendant acted 
purposefully or knowingly, on the defendant. Id. at 442-43. 
We reached our conclusion because in In re Winship, 397 
U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068 (1970), the Supreme Court held 
that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
required proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact 
necessary to constitute the crime charged. 
 
Humanik, then, was a case in which, whether the jury 
instructions were correct or not under state law, the 
petitioner, Humanik, was entitled to relief because the 
instructions violated his constitutional rights which were 
derived from a federal source. Yet in Humanik we did not 
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undertake to determine whether the New Jersey courts 
properly identified the elements of the offense charged in 
the state indictment, in particular the need for proof of the 
defendant's intent. Rather, we concerned ourselves with an 
issue under the Constitution, the allocation of the burden 
of proof on the elements of the offense as defined by the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey. 
 
Accordingly, in Humanik, even though we found that the 
state trial court's instructions to the jury did not correctly 
reflect New Jersey law, we did not, without more, find that 
the petitioner was entitled to habeas corpus relief. We 
reached the conclusion that Humanik was entitled to such 
relief only when we applied a federal source of law, namely, 
In re Winship, and then determined that the jury 
instructions did not satisfy federal law.1  
 
Johnson's problem is that he cannot point to a federal 
requirement that jury instructions on the elements of an 
offense when justification is in issue include particular 
provisions, nor can he demonstrate that the jury 
instructions deprived him of a defense which federal law 
provided to him. In short, he cites no authority for the 
proposition that federal law entitled him to the jury 
instructions on justification that he contends should have 
been given. The closest he comes is to contend that his 
interpretation of section 508 is consistent with Tennessee v. 
Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 105 S.Ct. 1694 (1985), which 
determined when a police officer constitutionally could use 
force to effectuate an arrest. Br. at 26. But the Supreme 
Court opinion in Garner did not establish a federal right to 
particular jury instructions to a jury in a state criminal 
case when justification is in issue. Rather, the case 
established the circumstances in which a state may 
authorize a police officer to use deadly force to effectuate an 
arrest. Therefore, Johnson's petition differs from Humanik's 
whose petition successfully identified an error of federal law 
at his state trial, i.e., the unconstitutional placing of a 
burden of proof of an element of the offense on him. But 
this case, unlike Humanik, does not include a Winship 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The New Jersey legislature has amended section 2C:4-2 to comply 
with our holding in Humanik. 
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issue, inasmuch as the trial court charged the jury that the 
state had to disprove the justification defense beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the district court correctly 
denied Johnson's petition because the error that he asserts 
existed in the jury instructions on the justification issue 
implicates only state law issues. 
 
Under the foregoing analysis, it does not matter whether 
we are bound by the Superior Court opinion because even 
if we rejected that opinion and agreed with Johnson that 
the trial court and the Superior Court made a mistake in 
construing state law, we would deny his petition inasmuch 
as the jury instructions did not violate any federal right 
which he possessed. Furthermore, even if we found that the 
trial court and the Superior Court were correct under state 
law, we would grant Johnson relief if we found that the jury 
instructions violated his federal rights. Thus, it does not 
matter whether we re-examine the state law issue because, 
regardless of the result of the re-examination, we cannot 
grant Johnson relief. 
 
In reaching our result, we have not lost sight of Hicks v. 
Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343, 100 S.Ct. 2227 (1980), in which 
a defendant based a due process claim on an error in jury 
instructions. In Hicks, the Oklahoma state trial court 
instructed the jury that if it found the defendant guilty of 
distributing heroin, it must sentence him to a 40-year term 
of imprisonment as an habitual offender. Id. at 345, 100 
S.Ct. at 2228-29. The problem with the instructions in 
Hicks was that after the trial, the Oklahoma Court of 
Criminal Appeals declared the mandatory sentencing 
statute unconstitutional in another case so that under the 
applicable valid law the jury could have sentenced the 
defendant to a term of not less than ten years in prison. 
See Thigpen v. State, 571 P.2d 467 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977). 
Thus, the erroneous instruction forced the jury to sentence 
the defendant in Hicks to a term four times longer than it 
was required to impose. Yet on the defendant's direct 
appeal, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed 
his sentence, finding that he was not prejudiced by the 
impact of the invalid statute, as his sentence was within 
the range that the jury could have imposed in any event. 
The Supreme Court granted the defendant's petition for 
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certiorari and vacated the judgment on due process 
grounds. 
 
In Hicks, the state court declared that the statute in 
question was unconstitutional and thus the federal courts 
did not make a determination of state law. Rather, in Hicks 
the Supreme Court held that the error was not harmless 
and that due process of law required that the case not be 
viewed as involving only state law concerns. Accordingly, 
Hicks differs fundamentally from this case, as here 
Johnson has invited the federal courts to make state law 
determinations. Furthermore, even though the error in the 
jury instructions in Hicks can be seen as an error of state 
law in one sense, the instructions may be viewed as having 
in themselves violated federal law, as the Oklahoma Court 
of Criminal Appeals in Thigpen invalidated the mandatory 
sentencing statute for vagueness without clearly indicating 
whether it was doing so based on federal or state 
constitutional grounds.2 
 
Of course, Hicks involved an unusual situation which the 
Supreme Court concluded required due process treatment. 
But the Court has not applied Hicks to mean that every 
error of state law affecting the outcome of a state criminal 
proceeding would be cognizable as a due process claim. If 
the Court did so hold, then the district courts in habeas 
cases effectively would become state appellate courts one 
rung above the state courts of last resort. The Court has 
made it clear that the district courts do not have that 
function. Furthermore, in Hicks the jury was the sentencing 
authority and thus was in the same position as a judge 
who sentenced a defendant to a mandatory term of 
imprisonment without recognizing that the law did not 
require the imposition of that term. We think that a judicial 
error of that kind would violate a defendant's due process 
protections and we see no reason why a different result 




2. The Oklahoma court probably intended to void the statute on 
Fourteenth Amendment grounds, as it annexed an advisory opinion to 
its opinion which found the sentencing statute invalid under that 
amendment. 
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c. The Superior Court opinion is conclusive. 
 
We do not base our opinion exclusively on the foregoing 
analysis, as the parties have not focused their arguments 
on the question of whether Johnson's challenge to the jury 
instructions involves state law issues not cognizable in 
these proceedings. Indeed, the appellees contend only in a 
conclusory fashion within a footnote in their brief that 
Johnson raises only issues of state law not entitling him to 
federal relief. Br. at 20 n.7. Thus, we affirm the order of the 
district court for the additional reason that we agree with it 
that the Superior Court opinion on Johnson's direct appeal 
is binding, the result being that we cannot find that the 
trial court made an error of law in the jury instructions 
under section 508. In reaching this conclusion, we discuss 
three of our opinions that we list in the order in which we 
decided them, Barry, 864 F.2d 294, Humanik, 871 F.2d 
432, and Vance v. Lehman, 64 F.3d 119 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. 
denied, 116 S.Ct. 736 (1996). 
 
In Barry, the petitioner sought federal habeas corpus 
relief following his New Jersey conviction on charges 
involving the distribution of dangerous controlled 
substances. The petitioner had sought to appeal from his 
conviction to the Appellate Division of the New Jersey 
Superior Court, but he was unable to afford counsel to 
represent him even though he did have certain assets. 
Thus, he did not perfect his appeal. Eventually, however, 
the public defender found that the petitioner was eligible for 
representation by its office so it entered an appearance for 
him and moved to reinstate his appeal. The Appellate 
Division denied the motion, as it held that under state law 
the petitioner's property holdings rendered him ineligible for 
the services of the public defender. After the Supreme 
Court of New Jersey declined to review the Appellate 
Division's order, the petitioner sought federal habeas 
corpus relief. The district court granted relief on the ground 
that the Appellate Division's order was an interference with 
the public defender's determination that the petitioner was 
eligible for representation and was unauthorized by state 
law. Barry, 864 F.2d at 298. 
 
On the appeal from the district court's order granting the 
writ, we held that the petitioner was entitled to habeas 
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corpus relief on a different basis from that on which the 
district court granted it. In reaching our decision, we 
expressly disapproved the district court's action in 
concluding that the Appellate Division had erred under 
state law, though we recognized that the district court's 
holding was based "on a plausible interpretation of state 
law." Id. We held that "the district court is bound by the 
state court's determination of state substantive law" and 
that a "district court may not substitute its interpretation of 
state law for that of the state court whose action it is 
reviewing." Id. We gave the following explanation of the 
powers of a federal habeas corpus court with respect to 
state law issues: 
 
We have found no decision of the New Jersey Supreme 
Court compelling the rationale we attribute to the 
Appellate Division or the rationale the district court 
believes state law requires. We do not believe that this 
uncertainty leaves the district court free to predict 
what the New Jersey Supreme Court would do. In a 
diversity case, for example, federal courts act on cases 
which have not been before the state court for decision 
and must determine, and often predict, what 
substantive law to apply. In habeas cases, by contrast, 
district courts act after the state court has decided the 
state law and applied it to the same record that is 
before the habeas court. To permit federal courts to 
speculate about the direction state law may take in the 
face of an authoritative final decision of a state court in 
the same case would directly interfere with the state's 
ability to decide the meaning of its own law. 
 
Id. at 298 n.5. In view of Barry's holding with respect to the 
binding effect of state court opinions on state law, there can 
be no doubt that, if standing alone, Barry would have 
compelled the district court in this case to treat the 
Superior Court decision as an authoritative and binding 
determination of state law with the result to deny 




3. Of course, even if Barry had adopted the district court's 
understanding of state law, in our view that adoption would not have 
been the basis for habeas relief as the mistake of state law by a state 
court would not have implicated a federal issue. 
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But Barry does not stand alone, for Humanik followed 
shortly thereafter. In that case, Humanik, in addition to 
making the constitutional argument we described above, 
contended that section 2C:4-2 was being applied 
unconstitutionally to him, as its provision placing the 
burden of proof on a defendant to establish that he had a 
mental disease or defect by a preponderance of the evidence 
was added after he committed his offense, though before 
his trial. Humanik regarded this application of the statute 
as a violation of the ex post facto clause. We rejected this 
argument on the ground that the Appellate Division found 
that the amendment did not change "existing law relative to 
the defendant's burden of proving mental disease or defect." 
Humanik, 871 F.2d at 436. 
 
In Humanik we quoted Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. at 
691, 95 S.Ct. at 1886, for the point that in federal habeas 
corpus cases "state courts are the ultimate expositors of 
state law [and federal courts are] bound by their 
constructions except in rare circumstances." Humanik, 871 
F.2d at 436. We then went on and analyzed state law and 
concluded that the Appellate Division had made a 
"reasonable" interpretation of New Jersey law before the 
amendment of section 2C:4-2. Thus, Johnson suggests that 
we should determine whether the Superior Court's decision 
with respect to the instructions to the jury on justification 
was reasonable. 
 
More recently in Vance, 64 F.3d 119, we once again dealt 
with the effect of a decision of an intermediate state court 
of appeals in a federal habeas corpus case, the court being, 
as here, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania. In Vance, the 
petitioner claimed that he had been denied effective 
representation of counsel when he was convicted in a 
Pennsylvania trial court because his attorney had procured 
his admission to the state bar through material 
misrepresentations so that his admission was void ab initio. 
Thus, in the petitioner's view, he was not represented by 
counsel at the trial. 
 
In the course of our opinion we pointed out that the 
Superior Court held that when the attorney represented the 
petitioner at the trial he was authorized to practice law in 
Pennsylvania and that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
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"declined to review that decision and [the petitioner] has 
pointed to nothing suggesting that that court would reach 
a different result were it to consider the issue." Vance, 64 
F.3d at 123. We indicated that in these circumstances, "we 
accept the holding of the Superior Court as the law of 
Pennsylvania," id., citing West v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 
311 U.S. at 236-37, 61 S.Ct. at 183, as support for our 
holding. Johnson sees Vance as giving us authority to 
review the decision of the Superior Court because West 
held that: 
 
Where an intermediate appellate state court rests its 
considered judgment upon the rule of law which it 
announces, that is a datum for ascertaining state law 
which is not to be disregarded by a federal court unless 
it is convinced by other persuasive data that the 
highest court of the state would decide otherwise. This 
is the more so where, as in this case, the highest court 
has refused to review the lower court's decision 
rendered in one phase of the very litigation which is 
now prosecuted by the same parties before the federal 
court. 
 
West, 311 U.S. at 237, 61 S.Ct. at 183 (citations omitted). 
 
Barry, Humanik, and Vance, of course, are not 
incompatible because in all three cases we followed the 
opinion of the state intermediate appellate court with 
respect to its determination of state law. Yet there is no 
denying that the language and reasoning of the three cases 
is not completely consistent and certainly Vance  would 
suggest that the federal courts in habeas corpus cases have 
broader authority to decline to follow opinions of a state 
intermediate appellate court than Barry recognized. 
 
We could determine the binding effect of a decision of an 
intermediate state court of appeals in a habeas corpus case 
by holding that Barry, as the earliest of the three germane 
opinions, is determinative under our Internal Operating 
Procedures. See Third Circuit I.O.P. 9.1. But we prefer, 
instead, to analyze the cases so as to clarify the law on the 
point. We think that the implications of Vance are too broad 
because Vance relied on West, which was a civil diversity of 
citizenship case. A federal court in a diversity case takes 
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the place of a state court in an original proceeding only 
because of the citizenship of the parties and the amount in 
controversy. On the other hand, in a habeas corpus case a 
federal court has a role secondary to a state court and, only 
after state proceedings, determines whether a petitioner "is 
in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or 
treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 
 
Thus, in a habeas corpus case, a federal court, unlike a 
federal court in a diversity of citizenship case, does not 
substitute for a state court. Accordingly, it is appropriate 
and consistent with Mullaney v. Wilbur that a federal court 
in a habeas corpus case be most circumspect in re- 
examining state court decisions. We also point out that 
while we are well aware that a federal habeas corpus 
proceeding is not an appeal from the underlying state 
proceeding, see, e.g., Rimmer v. Fayetteville Police Dep't, 
567 F.2d 273, 276-77 (4th Cir. 1977), it is consistent with 
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which limits the scope of 
federal review of state court proceedings, to confine 
narrowly the scope of federal review in habeas corpus cases 
of state court determinations of law. See Blake v. 
Papadakos, 953 F.2d 68, 71-72 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 
On the other hand, we would be reluctant to hold that a 
federal district court, no matter what the circumstances, 
always must follow an intermediate appellate state court 
opinion announcing the state law in earlier proceedings 
involving the petitioner. After all, it is possible that a state 
supreme court might hold that the intermediate appellate 
court had been wrong in an earlier case. In such a 
situation, it hardly would do violence to federal-state 
relations if a district court declined to apply the overruled 
decision of the intermediate appellate court even if it had 
not been reversed. Indeed, quite the opposite would be true, 
for considerations of comity would suggest that the district 
court should follow the supreme court opinion. 
 
In the end, then, we conclude that only in extraordinary 
and compelling circumstances should a federal district 
court in a habeas corpus case decline to follow the opinions 
of a state intermediate court of appeal with respect to state 
law rendered in earlier proceedings involving the petitioner. 
This case does not even approach that exacting standard, 
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as we have here nothing more than an argument over the 
meaning of section 508. We acknowledge that Johnson 
makes a plausible, indeed even a strong case, that the 
Superior Court erred in construing section 508, although it 
is also evident that on the facts as developed at trial the 
trial court's supplemental instructions to the jury may have 
cured any error it originally may have made in the jury 
instructions. Nevertheless, even if the Superior Court erred 
and even if we would have granted a new trial had we been 
entertaining Johnson's direct appeal, Johnson's showing 
does not satisfy the criteria justifying a federal court to 
depart from that Superior Court decision. Consequently, 
the district court properly denied Johnson's petition for a 




For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of 
August 29, 1996. 
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